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DON'T BLAME GOOGLE: ALLOWING TRADEMARK
INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS AGAINST
COMPETITORS WHO PURCHASE SPONSORED
LINKS ON INTERNET SEARCH ENGINES UNDER
THE INITIAL INTEREST CONFUSION DOCTRINE
Gregory R. Shoemaker+
Imagine you sit down to check your e-mail when you remember hearing
about a new Audi sports car. You Google "Audi" and more than 184,000,000
search results appear on your computer screen. Along the top and side of the
screen, several sites appear to be highlighted over the other search results. As
your mouse moves toward the first link, you think: Google is so efficient, it
even picked the best results, and unfortunately you do not notice that the
highlighted sites are in a section titled "sponsored links." Instead of Audi's
official website, you are directed to Infinity's website, one of Audi's main
competitors.' Even though you initially think that Infinity should not be
allowed to misdirect consumers in this way, you are quickly distracted by
Infinity's new line of luxury cars and soon forget why you even Googled
"Audi" in the first place.
The scenario described above is the subject of a new and unsettled area of
trademark law. Trademark law serves two primary purposes: protecting
private interests and the interests of the general public. 2 First, trademarks
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1. Cf Emily Steel, Google Search Ads Rile Its Big Customers, WALL ST. J., June 3, 2008,
at B 1, available at http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print/SB 121245191440539815.html
(discussing a similar example where the author ran a Google search for "Marriott Atlanta,"
clicked on the link labeled "Marriott Atlanta," but was directed to "www.hoteltravel.com, a
discount hotel-reservations site").
2. See t J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 3:2, at 3-3 to -4 (4th ed. 1996 & Supp. 2006) [hereinafter MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS] (listing the four fundamental functions of trademarks); Gregory Shea, Note,
Trademarks and Keyword Banner Advertising, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 529, 557 (2002) (stating that
"[t]rademark law focuses on protecting consumers"); see also Horphag Research Ltd. v.
Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Federal trademark law addresses 'the dual
purposes of infringement law: ensuring that owners of trademarks can benefit from the goodwill
associated with their marks and that customers can distinguish among competing producers."'
(quoting Thane Int'l v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 900-01 (9th Cir. 2002))).
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protect the private interests of trademark owners by identifying and
distinguishing the source of a particular product. 3 Second, trademarks protect
the public's interest by protecting consumer satisfaction and preference, also
known as "good will. ' 4 Trademark law serves to answer the question: what
happens when a trademark is used by someone other than its true owner? 5
Unless the user can assert a defense such as fair use,6 the unauthorized use of
another's trademark is trademark infringement.7
The traditional common-law test for trademark infringement under the
Lanham Act8 is the "likelihood of confusion test."9 The multi-factor likelihood
3. See Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000); MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra
note 2, §§ 3:1 to :2, at 3-2 to -3 (quoting the Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 ("Trademark")).
As trademark law has developed, "there appeared the notion that the right in a trademark is an
actual property right." BEVERLY W. PATTISHALL ET AL., TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 1.03, at 6 (6th ed. 2005) (discussing the historical Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S.
82, 92 (1879)). Today, "[t]he notion that trade identity rights are property rights remains strong."
Id. (citing Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666
(1999)).
4. MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 3:2, at 3-4. Scholars have observed that
"[tihe public interest against deception is necessarily a fundamental consideration in trade identity
unfair competition cases, yet the treatment of that interest is often residual to what is primarily a
private complaint." PATrISHALL ET AL., supra note 3, § 1.04, at 12. Many courts have
considered this public interest when deciding trademark cases. See, e.g., T & T Mfg. Co. v. A.T.
Cross Co., 587 F.2d 533, 537-38 (1st Cir. 1978) (stating that "the area of trademarks is vitally
concerned with the protection of the public interest"); Gen. Baking Co. v. Gorman, 3 F.2d 891,
893 (1st Cir. 1925) (The court explained that "[i]t should never be overlooked that trade-mark and
unfair competition cases are affected with a public interest. A dealer's good will is protected, not
merely for his profit, but in order that the purchasing public may not be enticed into buying A.'s
product when it wants B.'s product.").
5. See generally MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 23:1, at 23-7 to -10
(setting forth the likelihood of confusion test as the basic test for trademark infringement).
6. See Cosmetically Sealed Indus. v. Chesebrough-Pond's USA Co., 125 F.3d 28, 30 (2d
Cir. 1997) (noting that the fair-use defense "permits others to use protected marks in descriptive
ways, but not as marks identifying their own products"). Under the Lanham Act, "[s]ection
33(b)(4)... defines fair use as: 'a use, other[] than as a mark, of... [a trademark] and used fairly
and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of [a] party .... ' Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ II 15(b)(4) (1994)).
7. See Cosmetically Sealed Indus., 125 F.3d at 30 (holding that "[flair use is a defense to
liability under the Lanham Act even if a defendant's conduct would otherwise constitute
infringement of another's trademark").
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127.
9. MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 23:1, at 23-7 to -10; see also KP
Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression 1, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 116-17 (2004) (addressing
a circuit split regarding the fair use defense to the likelihood of confusion test); Two Pesos, Inc. v.
Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992) (holding that "liability under [the Lanham Act]
requires proof of the likelihood of confusion"). There are eight basic factors used to determine
whether confusion is likely: "(1) strength of the plaintiff's mark, (2) relatedness of the goods or
services, (3) similarity of the marks, (4) evidence of actual confusion, (5) marketing channels
used, (6) likely degree of purchaser care, (7) the defendant's intent in selecting its mark, and (8)
likelihood of expansion of product lines." Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP,
423 F.3d 539, 548 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing the eight-factor test set forth in Frisch's Rests., Inc. v.
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of confusion test asks whether a defendant's use of a symbol or phrase is likely
to confuse or deceive customers into thinking that there is some sponsorship
between the trademark owner and the infringing mark.' 0 In the context of
trademark misuse via the Internet, the three critical factors for evaluating
likelihood of confusion are: "'(1) the similarity of the marks, (2) the
relatedness of the goods and services, and (3) the parties' simultaneous use of
the internet as a marketing channel.""'
There are also several different types of "confusion" that can trigger liability
in the context of trademark law. 12 One type of likelihood of confusion is called
"initial interest confusion."' 3 Trademark infringement under the initial interest
confusion doctrine occurs when a product generates initial customer interest by
using another's trademark, even if the customer never actually buys the
infringing product. 14 By using the trusted symbol or logo of a successful
Elby's Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th Cir. 1982)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979) (listing
similar factors used by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for the likelihood
of confusion test); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961)
(establishing one of the first multi-factor likelihood of confusion tests). One of the most
exhaustive multi-factor lists, used in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, lists thirteen separate
factors for consideration. PATISHALL ET AL., supra note 3, § 7.03, at 282 (citing the factors
from In re E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973), which were
later adopted by the Federal Circuit, successor to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals).
10. MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 23:1, at 23-9. Conducting the likelihood
of confusion balancing test is not "mathematical precision," but merely a "guide to help
determine whether confusion is likely." Gibson Guitar, 423 F.3d at 548 (quoting Homeowners
Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1107 (6th Cir. 1991)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
11. See Perfumebay.com Inc. v. Ebay Inc., 506 F.3d 1165, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Interstellar Starship Servs. Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2002)). The Ninth
Circuit drolly referred to these three factors as "the internet trilogy." Id; see also Interstellar
Starship Servs. Ltd. v. Epix, Inc. (Interstellar Starship I1), 304 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2002)
(referring to the same three factors as "the internet trinity"); Soilworks, L.L.C. v. Midwest Indus.
Supply, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1131 (D. Ariz. 2008) (analyzing the factors that make up the
"internet trinity").
12. MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 23:5, at 23-20 to -21 (listing point-of-
sale confusion, post-sale confusion, initial interest confusion, and reverse confusion as
actionable). The court explained:
The most common and widely recognized type of confusion that creates infringement is
purchaser confusion of source which occurs at the time of purchase: point of sale
confusion. However point of sale confusion does not mark the outer boundaries of
trademark infringement. The vast majority of courts recognize post-sale confusion,
which may occur among those who see an infringing mark in use by an owner who
were [sic] not confused at the time they bought the product.
Id.
13. Id. § 23:5, at 23-12 ("[I]nitial interest confusion which is dispelled by the time of
purchase can also be actionable.").
14. Id. § 23:6, at 23-28. McCarthy defines initial interest confusion as "confusion that
creates initial customer interest, even though no actual sale is finally completed as a result of the
confusion." Id. Additionally, "[m]ost courts now recognize the initial interest confusion theory
2009]
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company, the usurper capitalizes on the trademark's goodwill, granting the
infringing product credibility early in the transaction. 15 Initial interest
confusion prevents the trademark owner's product from being considered by
the customer even once the customer's initial confusion is gone.
6
In the context of an Internet case, initial interest confusion is evaluated
primarily on two factors: (1) the relatedness of the goods and (2) the level of
consumer sophistication and care. 17 These factors are important because
consumers are most likely to experience initial interest confusion when the
goods are related and consumer sophistication is low. 18 When the goods are
not related, and consumer sophistication is high, initial interest confusion is
less likely to occur. 19 Nevertheless, a complete likelihood of confusion
analysis is essential in evaluating initial interest confusion over the Internet.
20
as a form of likelihood of confusion which can trigger a finding of infringement." Id. § 23:6, at
23-8 & n.2 (citing cases from the United States Courts of Appeal for the Second, Third, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Federal Circuits). Some commentators suggest that "[w]hile
many appellate courts have found initial interest confusion to be actionable, not all have formally
adopted it." William D. Coston & Martin L. Saad, Don't Take the Bait-Initial Interest
Confusion Has its Limits 2 (Dec. 5, 2005) (unpublished paper, Intellectual Property Owners
Association) (on file with the Catholic University Law Review). Moreover, "[t]he Supreme Court
has not [specifically] considered initial interest confusion, but has repeatedly curbed lower court
expansion of trademark protections under the Lanham Act in the past several years." Id. at 7 n. 1
(citing Supreme Court cases from 2000 to 2003).
15. See Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 204 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 1987)).
16. See id. J. Thomas McCarthy provides an excellent discussion of initial interest
confusion:
The analogy to trademark initial interest confusion is a job-seeker who misrepresents
educational background on a resume, obtains an interview and at the interview explains
that the inflated resume claim is a mistake or a "typo." The misrepresentation has
enabled the job-seeker to obtain a coveted interview, a clear advantage over others with
the same background who honestly stated their educational achievements on their
resumes. In such a situation, it is not possible to say that the misrepresentation caused
no competitive damage.
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 23:6, at 23-35 to -36. Initial interest confusion
has also been described as "a variation on the practice of 'bait and switch."' Id. § 23:6, at 23-36
(citing Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 1996)).
17. Perfumebay.com, Inc. v. Ebay Inc., 506 F.3d 1165, 1176 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing
Interstellar Starship Servs. Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 945 (9th Cir. 2002)). In many initial
interest confusion cases, courts have cited to "consumer surveys and/or testimony supporting
those initial interest theories." Coston & Saad, supra note 14, at 11. Other court decisions,
Internet or otherwise, "demand some tie between the alleged initial confusion and a real
consequence in the marketplace." Id.
18. See Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc. (Interstellar Starship 11), 304 F.3d 936,
945 (9th Cir. 2002) (providing an example of how this analysis functions in reality).
19. See id. (suggesting that the inverse is true).
20. Perfumebay.com, 506 F.3d at 1176. This is also sometimes referred to as "likelihood of
initial interest confusion." E.g., Interstellar Starship II, 304 F.3d at 941.
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The initial interest confusion doctrine was created in the context of two
2 1cases: one involving the trademark of Steinway & Son's pianos, and the other
involving Mobil Oil's Pegasus logo.22 Courts have also extended the doctrine
to address a variety of Internet-related issues such as metatag use,23 domain-
24 25
name use, and the purchase of sponsored links on Internet search engines.
21. Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331,
1333-34, 1342 (2d Cir. 1975); see also infra notes 60-69 and accompanying text; cf Coston &
Saad, supra note 14, at 4 (suggesting that in addition to Steinway and Mobil "some later decisions
also cite to a 1962 amendment to § 43(a) of the Lanham Act as support for the initial interest
[confusion] doctrine."). Coston and Saad point out that the amendment made an important
change to the section that described the kinds of confusion that gave rise to liability under the
Act. Id. at 4-5. They state, "[t]he 1962 amendment removed the term 'purchasers' from the
Lanham Act's original [language:] . . . 'likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive
purchasers,"' so that both actual and potential purchasers are covered. Id. Additionally, the
legislative history shows that "Congress meant to include 'potential' purchasers as well as actual
purchasers in the analysis." Id at 5; see also S. REP. No. 87-2107, at 4 (1962), reprinted in 1962
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2844, 2847 ("The purpose of the proposed change is to . . . omit the word
'purchasers,' since the provision actually relates to potential purchasers as well as to actual
purchasers.").
22. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 255-56, 259 (2d Cir. 1987);
see also infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
23. E.g., Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 (9th
Cir. 1999) (discussing the potential for initial interest confusion in metatags). In defining
metatags, the court stated that "metatags are HTML code not visible to Web users but used by
search engines in determining which sites correspond to the keywords entered by a Web user."
Id. at 1061 n.23; see also PACCAR, Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 248 n.2 (6th
Cir. 2003) ("A 'metatag' is a list of words hidden in a web site acting as an index or reference
source identifying the context of the web site for search engines."); J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C. Ltd.
P'ship v. Settlement Funding LLC, No. 06-597, 2007 WL 30115, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007)
("'Meta tags' are pieces of Hyper Text Markup Language ('HTML') source code which contain
keywords used to describe the contents of a web page.").
There are three different types of metatags: (1) descriptive metatags, used to describe a
document; (2) keyword metatags, which are the type used by internet search engines to rank web
pages in order of relevancy; and (3) robot metatags, which tell a search engine not to list certain
web pages as relevant. J.G. Wentworth, 2007 WL 30115, at *2. Search engines function by first
"indexing relevant websites," and second "us[ing] algorithms to process the keywords in the meta
tags to produce a search results page that displays links to relevant websites in a list typically in
order of decreasing relevance." Id.
24. E.g., Interstellar Starship II, 304 F.3d at 964 (discussing initial interest confusion in the
context of domain names); see also Gregory R. Jones, What's in a Name? Trademark
Infringements in Cyberspace, 68 ALA. LAWYER 70, 71 (2007) (providing background on domain
name infringement). Jones also notes that "[d]omain name disputes are often resolved using the
Uniform Domain Name Resolution Policy ('URDP') process." Id.
25. E.g., Picture It Sold, Inc. v. iSOLD IT, LLC, 199 F. App'x 631, 632-33 (9th Cir. 2006);
Rhino Sports, Inc. v. Sport Court, Inc., CV-02-1815, 2007 WL 1302745, *1-2 (D. Ariz. May 2,
2007); see also Shea, supra note 2, at 546-55 (analyzing keyword banner advertising under the
initial interest confusion doctrine and its analogy to metatagging). The Supreme Court has not
extended the initial interest confusion doctrine into the area of product configurations. See, e.g.,
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 212-13 (2000) (indicating that product
configurations are not source identifying). But see Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith
Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d 539, 552 & n.17 (6th Cir. 2005) (discussing product shapes as trademarks,
2009]
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Reexamining the Audi hypothetical above, it is possible that Infinity's
website appeared in the search results for "Audi" because Infinity purchased
the right to have its website appear in the "sponsored links" section of
Google's results page. 26 Sponsored links are "paid advertisement[s] in the
form of. . . hypertext link[s] that show[] up on [a] search [engine's] results
27page," usually triggered by a keyword search. The theory is that every time
an Internet user searches for the term "Audi," he will also receive a link for
Infinity near the official Audi website. 28 This advertising strategy of
purchasing sponsored links 29 allows companies to advertise based on the
but expressing "no opinion on the extent to which trademark law can properly apply to product
shapes").
26. See Eric Fingerhut, Brand Name Buffet: Domainers Feast on Trademarks, LAw360,
Nov. 19, 2007 (on file with the Catholic University Law Review) (illustrating a similar
hypothetical involving an internet search using the term "Burger King").
27. Techweb.com, TechEncyclopedia, http://www.techweb.com/encyclopedia/defineterm.
jhtml?term=sponsored+link (last visited Feb. 6, 2009) (defining "sponsored link"); see also
Fingerhut, supra note 26 (discussing how sponsored links are sold through Google's Ad Words
program).
28. See Shea, supra note 2, at 529 ("Using trademarks as keywords gives companies the
benefit of placing their ad on a web page along with the link to their competitor's website. This
strategy can be a good way to reach consumers because the advertiser knows that if a consumer
enters a competitor's trademark as a keyword, the consumer is someone interested in that type of
product or service."); see also J.G. Wentworth, 2007 WL 30115, at *1 (summarizing the
plaintiff's argument that the defendant's "uses of plaintiffs name ensures that a link to
defendant's website will appear immediately proximate to a link to [plaintiff's] website when
individuals conduct intemet searches for 'J.G. Wentworth' or 'JG Wentworth'); Steel, supra
note 1 ("The problem is a tactic known as 'piggybacking,' in which smaller advertisers use major
players' brand names, slogans, or other trademarked words in the text of search ads to lure Web
surfers to their own sites.").
29. CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE TO ADVERTISING LAW AND AGREEMENTS § 9:11, at 9-
18 (March 2007) [hereinafter CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE]. Keyed advertising occurs when
"[a]n advertiser submits its advertisement to the search engine, such as Google, Inc., and then
bids on a particular keyword." Id. § 9:11, at 9-18 to -19. The issue arises because "[t]rademark
owners have asserted that this practice improperly allows parties to profit from the goodwill of
the trademarks." Id.; see also J.G. Wentworth, 2007 WL 30115, at *2 ("Google's AdWords
program is the keyword-triggered advertising program that generates the Sponsored Links section
on the search-results screen. Advertisers participating in AdWords purchase or bid on certain key
words, paying Google for the right to have links to their websites displayed in the Sponsored
Links section whenever an internet user searches for those words."); Fingerhut, supra note 26
(referring to this technique as "two[-]sided advertising").
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specific interests of Internet users. 30 For clarification, this Comment will refer
to this technique as "keyed advertising."
31
Keyed advertising has been at issue in recent trademark infringement
actions.32 In those cases, plaintiffs argue that the use of their trademarks in
keyed-advertising schemes constitutes trademark infringement under the initial
interest confusion doctrine. 33 In some cases, trademark owners sue the Internet
search engine (for example, Google) 34 for trademark infringement under an
30. Shea, supra note 2, at 533 (discussing keyword banner advertising). This technique has
also been referred to as keying, keyed advertising, keyword advertising, paid search advertising,
piggybacking, conquest buys, and a variety of other names. See Perfumebay.com Inc. v. Ebay
Inc., 506 F.3d 1165, 1169 (9th Cir. 2007) ("[E]Bay's dominant method of advertising is in paid
search advertising, which are sponsored links.., on Google or Yahoo." (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Christine D. Galbraith, Electronic Billboards Along the Information Superhighway:
Liability Under the Lanham Act for Using Trademarks to Key Internet Banner Ads, 41 B.C. L.
REV. 847, 848-50 (2000) (referring to "keyword advertising" and the technology of "keyed
advertising"); Zachary J. Zweihorn, Note, Searching for Confusion: The Initial Interest Confusion
Doctrine and Its Misapplication to Search Engine Sponsored Links, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1343,
1346-47 (2006) ("Keying occurs when search engines sell keyword search terms and program
their servers to present advertising links when a user searches those terms."); Steel, supra note 1,
at B8 (distinguishing between "piggybacking" and "conquest buys").
31. CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE, supra note 29, § 9:11 ("Keying is defined as the
practice by which a search engine sells and displays advertisements that are linked to specific
search terms a user enters into a search engine.") One commentator observed that "[t]he latest
extension of the initial interest confusion doctrine has been into search engines' use of search
terms to deliver targeted advertisements, a practice known as 'keying."' Zweihom, supra note
30, at 1364; see also Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory (Am. Blind), No. C-03-
5340, 2007 WL 1159950, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007).
32. See Picture It Sold, Inc. v. iSOLD IT, L.L.C., 199 F. App'x 631, 632-33 (9th Cir. 2006);
Rhino Sports, Inc. v. Sport Court, Inc., CV-02-1815, 2007 WL 1302745, at *7 (D. Ariz. May 2,
2007); Am. Blind, 2007 WL 1159950, at *1; Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d
393, 395-96 (N.D.N.Y. 2006); Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp.
2d 402, 408-10 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc. (GEICO 11), No.
1:04-CV-507, 2005 WL 1903128, at * 1-2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005).
Most recently, Rosetta Stone, a computer software company, sued a competitor for trademark
infringement when the competitor purchased keyed advertising on Rosetta Stone's trademark.
See Complaint at 6-7, Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Rocket Languages Ltd., No. CV08-04402 (C.D. Cal.
July 2, 2008); see also Posting of Dan Slater to Law Blog, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/
07/07/unhappy-with-its-google-search-results-rosetta-stone-sues-competitor/ (July 7, 2008, 15:07
EST) (providing links to a copy of the complaint and discussing Rosetta Stone's allegations).
33. E.g., Picture It Sold, 199 F. App'x at 633-34; Rhino Sports, 2007 WL 1302745, at * 1, 7
(trademark owners were actually defendants because the potential infringer filed a declaratory
action). The damage done to trademark owners in these situations "may consist of lost Internet
traffic, and thus revenues, due to consumers becoming confused and/or giving up on their search
for the brand owners' Web sites, consumers being misdirected to competitors of the brand owner,
and consumers becoming distracted by unsavory or pornographic Web sites." Fingerhut, supra
note 26.
34. See Steel, supra note I (noting that in addition to Google, Yahoo Inc. and Microsoft
Corp. are the "other main players in the search-advertising market").
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initial interest confusion theory. 35 In others, trademark owners sue the
competitor who purchased the keyed advertising under the same trademark
36theory. The latter scenario is the focus of this Comment.
In 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized
the significance of keyed advertising and posed the following question:
Whether the purchase of keyed advertising by a competitor on another's
trademark is "sufficiently analogous to metatag use so as to be prohibited"
under the initial interest confusion doctrine? 3  It is this analogy between
metatag use and keyed advertising that is the focus of this Comment.
38
Although the outcome in many of these cases turns on whether a trademark
owner can prove its prima facie case, 39 a company's purchase of keyed
advertising on a competitor's trademark is analogous to metatag use and
should be considered trademark infringement under the initial interest
confusion doctrine.4 °
Part I of this Comment traces the development of the initial interest
confusion doctrine by reviewing the Lanham Act and examining the evolution
of the doctrine from its creation in the brick-and-mortar world through its
application in the Internet era. Part II of this Comment analyzes the current
law as applied to the analogy posed by the Ninth Circuit in Picture It Sold, Inc.
v. iSOLD IT, L.L. C.4 1 Part II also frames the current problem facing federal
district and circuit courts: whether keyed advertising can be trademark
infringement under an initial interest confusion theory. Finally, Part III of this
Comment argues that a competitor who purchases keyed advertising on
35. See, e.g., Rescuecom, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 395-96, 400-01; Steel, supra note 1 ("[In]
August [2007], American Airlines filed a suit against Google in federal court ... ").
36. See, e.g., Picture It Sold, 199 F. App'x at 632-33; see also Slater, supra note 32 ("But
rather than going after Google, Rosetta Stone is suing Rocket Languages . . . the company
[Rosetta] claims is 'piggybacking' its Internet advertising on Rosetta Stone's name.").
37. Picture It Sold, 199 F. App'x at 634. The Ninth Circuit presented this question based on
a very limited trial record from the Northern District of California. Id. at 632-33. Consequently,
the court suggested that in order to be able to resolve this issue, Picture It Sold!, Inc. (Picture It
Sold) would need further discovery "to prove that I Sold It was indeed purchasing advertising on
its trademark at some point in the past." Id. at 633-34. In fact, the court further noted that it had
"received a post-argument submission from Picture It Sold" that provided evidence that iSOLD
IT did purchase advertising on Picture It Sold's trademark. Id. at 634 n.4. However, because the
evidence was not part of the record before the court, the Ninth Circuit ruled that it must first be
submitted to the district court. Id.
38. See infra Parts II-III. Some commentators argue that the analogy between metatag use
and keyed advertising is flawed. See Shea, supra note 2, at 548 (arguing that, while metatag use
and purchasing keyed advertising are analogous, neither creates a likelihood of confusion that
should be protected by trademark law); Zweihorn, supra note 30, at 1381 (arguing that the
application of the initial interest confusion doctrine to metatag use and keyed advertising should
be reconsidered).
39. See, e.g., Picture It Sold, 199 F. App'x at 633-34 & n.4.
40. See infra Part III; see also Picture It Sold, 199 F. App'x at 633-34 (posing the narrow
question answered in this Comment).
41. 199 F. App'x at 633-34.
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another's trademark should be liable for trademark infringement, applying the
metatag analogy expressed in Picture It Sold.42 Part III then argues that the
initial interest confusion doctrine has not outlived its utility and should be
extended to remedy this type of trademark infringement.
I. INITIAL INTEREST CONFUSION: A DIFFERENT TYPE OF LIKELIHOOD OF
CONFUSION UNDER TRADEMARK LAW
A. The Lanham Act: Trademark and Unfair Competition Law
The Lanham Act, passed in 1946, 43 codified then-existing trademark and
unfair-competition common law. 44 The Act provided for the registration of
trademarks with the U.S. Patent Office4 5 and created a cause of action for the
infringement of both registered and unregistered trademarks. 46  Since its
passage, the Lanham Act has been amended several times to address new
trademark issues.47 For example, Congress passed an amendment adding anti-
cybersquatting provisions to the Lanham Act in order to address trademark
issues on the Internet. 4
The Lanham Act contains several key provisions that are integral to the
discussion of keyed advertising and are helpful in understanding trademark
infringement law in general. Section 43 of the Lanham Act grants trademark
42. Id.; see also Shea, supra note 2, at 548 (discussing how metatagging and keyword
banner advertising confuse consumers in the same manner).
43. Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-
1129 (2000)).
44. See PATrISHALL ET AL., supra note 3, § 1.01, at 1-4 (tracking the development of
trademark law through history up to the codification of the common law in the Lanham Act).
Pattishall explains that "[alll trademark cases are in fact cases of unfair competition." Id. § 1.02,
at 4 (citing Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916)). Trademark law, in
the context of unfair competition law, can be boiled down to one idea: "[n]o one has any right to
represent his goods as the goods of another, and this is merely the duty to abstain from fraud." Id.
45. See Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2000)
(calling for the registration of a trademark to be filed in what is now the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office).
46. Id. at 437-38 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000)) (registered); id at 441
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000)) (unregistered).
47. See, e.g., The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, §§ 101-136,
102 Stat. 3935, 3935-48 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127); see also PATTISHALL ET AL.,
supra note 3, § 1.02, at 4 (discussing how amendments to the Lanham Act addressed the issue of
trademark counterfeiting and added new provisions on cybersquatting, the federal registration
system, and the multi-national registration system).
48. The Anticybersquatting Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1536 (1999)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1129); see also PATTISHALL ET AL., supra note 3, § 1.01, at 4 (stating
that anticybersquatting provisions were needed due to the growth of the intemet). The
anticybersquatting provisions of the Lanham Act were added to address "bad faith registration of
domain names that correspond to trademarks owned by others." Id. The most recent amendment
to the Lanham Act in 2003 added the multi-national trademark registration system under the
Madrid Protocol. 1d.
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owners the right to bring a civil suit against anyone who "uses" another's
trademark "in commerce" when that use is likely to confuse or deceive
consumers in advertising or promotion.4 9 This is the Act's initial reference to
the traditional likelihood of confusion test.50 Section 45 of the Lanham Act
defines terms of art, such as "trademark" and "use in commerce.' 51 The term
"trademark" includes any word, name, or symbol used to identify and
distinguish goods, even if the source of the goods is unknown. The phrase
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). This section states in full:
(a) Civil action
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description
of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's
goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely
to be damaged by such act.
Id.
50. See id.
51. Id. § 1127. Section 45 defines "trademark" as:
The term "trademark" includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof-
(1) used by a person, or
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to
register on the principal register established by this chapter,
to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that
source is unknown.
Id.
Lanham Act § 45 also defines "use in commerce":
The term "use in commerce" means the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary
course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark. For purposes of this
chapter, a mark shall be deemed to be in use in commerce-
(1) on goods when-
(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the
displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the
nature of the goods makes such placement impracticable, then on documents
associated with the goods or their sale, and
(B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and
(2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services
and the services are rendered in commerce, or the services are rendered in more
than one State or in the United States and a foreign country and the person
rendering the services is engaged in commerce in connection with the services.
Id.
52. Id.
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"use in commerce" refers to the "bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course
of trade., 53 Finally, § 32 establishes remedies for violations of the act,54 § 34
empowers courts to grant injunctive relief,55 and § 35 provides for the recovery
of profits, costs of the action, and, in exceptional circumstances, attorneys
fees. 56
Unlike the likelihood of confusion test, which appears in § 43,57 the Lanham
Act does not contain a provision creating a cause of action for initial interest
confusion. 58 Instead, the courts created the initial interest confusion doctrine in
the early 1970s in response to cases in which the traditional likelihood of
confusion test was insufficient to hold culpable defendants liable.
59
B. Initial Interest Confusion in the Pre-Internet World
Even though the cases that created the initial interest confusion doctrine date
to a time before the widespread use of personal computers and the Internet,
these cases provide an important backdrop for applying the doctrine in the
Internet era. One of the first courts to recognize trademark infringement under
the initial interest confusion theory was the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York in Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg
Nachf v. Steinway & Sons (Grotrian 1). 60 In Grotrian I, a German
corporation, competing with the well-known piano manufacturer Steinway &
Sons, made and sold pianos under the trade name "Grotrian-Steinweg."
6 1
Grotrian-Steinweg brought a declaratory judgment action seeking an opinion
that its trademark did not infringe Steinway's trademarks. 62 The issue before
the court was whether "the mark Grotrian-Steinweg on the piano is similar
enough to Steinway or to Steinway & Sons that its use is likely to cause
confusion, mistake or deception of any kind. 6 3
Before adopting the initial interest confusion theory, the court examined the
factors under the traditional likelihood of confusion test, asking whether
53. Id.
54. Id. § 1114.
55. Id. § 1116.
56. Id. § 1117.
57. Id. § 1125(a).
58. See id. §§ 1051-1129 (providing other causes of action, not mentioning initial interest
confusion).
59. See Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons (Grotrian 1),
365 F. Supp. 707, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd, 523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975) (modifying the
judgment on the issue of laches).
60. See id.; see also MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 23:6, at 23-28 to -29
(describing Grotrian I as "one of the first cases [to] develop[] the initial interest confusion
theory").
61. Grotrian I, 365 F. Supp. at 709.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 712 (emphasis omitted).
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defendant's use of the trademark was likely to confuse or deceive consumers.64
The court noted that there were many relevant factors under this test," but
ultimately focused on the "degree of likely consumer care.' '66 Applying the
test to the facts of the case, the court found that although purchasers of
expensive pianos are very sophisticated, their sophistication does not eliminate
the possibility that the purchaser will be confused by the similarity of the
67marks. Consequently, the district court articulated the initial interest
confusion theory: "Misled into initial interest, a potential Steinway buyer may
satisfy himself that the less expensive Grotrian-Steinweg is at least as good, if
not better, than a Steinway. ' 6  On appeal (Grotrian 11), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adopted the trial court's theory of
liability, adding that "[s]uch initial [interest] confusion works an injury to
Steinway."
69
Twelve years later, the Second Circuit revisited the theory of initial interest
confusion in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp. In that case,
Mobil Oil sued Pegasus Petroleum for trademark infringement of its flying-
horse logo that represented Pegasus, a creature from Greek mythology. 71 The
Second Circuit analyzed Mobil Oil's claim for trademark infringement under
the likelihood of confusion test.72 The court discussed the potential for initial
64. See id.
65. Id. The court listed seven factors that must be considered in determining likelihood of
confusion:
[1] the strength of the Steinway mark; [2] the alleged infringer's purpose in adopting its
marks; [3] the degree of similarity between the marks; [4] the degree of similarity
between the products; [5] the competitive proximity of the products; [6] actual
confusion; and [7] the degree of care likely to be exercised by consumers.
Id. The court incorporated in its analysis six of these factors, including "competitive proximity of
the products," but overlooked two additional commonly used factors. Compare id at 712-17
(applying six factors for the likelihood of confusion test), with Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed
Smith Guitars, 423 F.3d 539, 548 (6th Cir. 2005) (referencing eight traditional likelihood of
confusion factors, including "marketing channels used" and "likelihood of expansion of product
lines").
66. Grotrian I, 365 F. Supp. at 716-17.
67. Id. at 717. The court rationalized that the sophistication of potential consumers "does
not always assure the absence of confusion." Id
68. Id. The court went on to say that "[d]eception and confusion thus work to appropriate
defendant's good will." Id.
69. Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons (Grotian 11), 523
F.2d 1331, 1341-42 & n.21 (2d Cir. 1975) (adopting the language of the district court's initial
interest confusion analysis).
70. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 1987).
71. Id. at 255. Mobil Oil's use of the Pegasus logo in connection with the petroleum
industry pre-dated Pegasus Petroleum's adoption of the Pegasus as its name by fifty years. Id. at
255-56.
72. Id. at 256-57. The court found that the district court did not err in equating Mobil's
logo with the word "Pegasus," stating that, while words and pictures "should not be equated as a
matter of law, a district court may make such a determination as a factual matter." Id. at 257.
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interest confusion alongside the degree of likely customer care, 73 and
concluded that initial interest confusion is "a sufficient trademark injury." 74
Together, Grotrian I, Grotrian 11, and Mobil Oil helped establish initial
interest confusion as a viable trademark theory in an era well before the
existence of the Internet. 75 In both Grotrian H and Mobil Oil, the Second
Circuit recognized the limitations of the traditional likelihood of confusion test
in cases where the trademark damage was primarily "based upon confusion
that create[d] initial customer interest. ' '76 The Second Circuit developed the
initial interest confusion doctrine to remedy this type of damage to trademark
owners. 77 Support for the doctrine has grown since its creation, and today has
been extended to cases involving the Internet.
78
73. Id. at 260. Sometimes the degree of likely customer care is analyzed as its own separate
factor, and sometimes it is analyzed as part of other factors. Compare Gibson Guitar Corp. v.
Paul Reed Smith Guitars, 423 F.3d 539, 548 (6th Cir. 2005) (listing likely purchaser care as its
own distinct factor), with In re Martin's Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 1566-67
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (considering likely purchaser care under a broader factor that compares the
named goods to the trademark used).
74. Mobil Oil, 818 F.2d at 260 (citing Grotrian 11, 523 F.2d at 1342) (affirming the district
court's judgment as to both claims of trademark infringement and unfair competition).
75. See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 23:6, at 23-28 to -30 & 23-28 n.2
(citing cases from the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Federal Circuits); see also, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin
Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1396, 1405 (9th Cir. 1997) (adopting the initial interest
confusion doctrine in a case that did not involve the Internet). But see Gibson Guitar, 423 F.3d at
551-52 (declining to extend the initial interest confusion doctrine to a non-internet case that
involved a trademark on the shape of a guitar). In that case, the plaintiff advanced the argument
that the shape of the defendant's guitar, when seen from afar, led to initial interest confusion
because the shape of defendant's guitar was very similar to the plaintiff's trademark. Id. at 552.
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected this argument and
held:
[M]any legitimately competing product shapes are likely to create some initial interest
in the competing product due to the competing product's resemblance to the better-
known product when viewed from afar. In other words, application of the initial
interest confusion doctrine to product shapes would allow trademark holders to protect
not only the actual product shapes they have trademarked, but also a "penumbra" of
more or less similar shapes that would not otherwise qualify for trademark protection.
Id. at 550 n.15.
76. See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 23:6, at 23-28; see also Mobil Oil,
818 F.2d at 260 (turning to the initial interest confusion theory after completing its analysis under
the traditional likelihood of confusion test); Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v.
Steinway & Sons (Grotrian fl), 523 F.2d 1331, 1342 (2d Cir. 1975) (declining to hold that actual
or potential point-of-sale confusion must be proven to establish trademark infringement).
77. See, e.g., Mobil Oil, 818 F.2d at 260 (applying the initial interest confusion doctrine
after a full analysis under the traditional likelihood of confusion test).
78. See, e.g., Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062
(9th Cir. 1999) ("West Coast's use of 'moviebuff.com' in metatags will still result in what is
known as initial interest confusion."). But see Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns
Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1025 n.16 (9th Cir. 2004) (identifying an exception to the initial interest
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C. Evolution of the Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine in the Internet Era
1. The Brookfield General Rule
In Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., the
Ninth Circuit extended the initial interest confusion doctrine to cases
concerning trademarks and the Internet.79 Brookfield Communications was a
company that collected and categorized information about the entertainment
industry and sold it to professionals in that market. Brookfield sued West
Coast Entertainment, a large video rental store chain, 81 for trademark
infringement regarding West Coast's use of Brookfield's trademark
"MovieBuff' in its Internet domain name "moviebuff.com." 82 Brookfield also
moved for a preliminary injunction of West Coast's use of "MovieBuff' in its
"metatags and buried code," 83 referring to the HTML code used on an Internet
webpage.8
4
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit began its analysis with the likelihood of
confusion test, examining West Coast's intentional use of the domain name
"moviebuff.com." 85 The court initially found that there was a likelihood of
confusion regarding West Coast's use of "moviebuff' as a domain name.
86
The court then suggested that, although the same likelihood of confusion test
could apply to West Coast's metatag use, doing so would ignore the
confusion doctrine when a banner advertisement or link "clearly identifies its source" or overtly
compares its product to that of the trademark owner).
79. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062.
80. Id. at 1041 ("Brookfield [sold] computer software featuring a searchable database
containing entertainment-industry related information marketed under the 'MovieBuff' mark
81. Id. at 1042-43.
82. Id. at 1043. Brookfield also "applied ex parte for a temporary restraining order,"
subsequently construed by the district court as a motion for a preliminary injunction, requesting
that West Coast be enjoined from:
[U]sing . . . in any manner ... the mark MOVIEBUFF, or any other term or terms
likely to cause confusion therewith, including moviebuff.com, as West Coast's domain
name .... as the name of West Coast's website service, in buried code or metatags on
their home page or web pages, or in connection with the retrieval of data or information
on other goods or services.
Id. at 1043 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. Id. at 1061.
84. Id. at 1061 & n.23; see also supra note 23 (providing background information on
metatags, buried code, and HTML code). Hyper Text Markup Language, commonly known as
HTML, is the hidden source code that "contain[s] keywords used to describe the contents of a
web page." J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C. Ltd. P'ship v. Settlement Funding LLC, No. 06-0597, 2007
WL 30115, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007).
85. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1053. The court first established that Brookfield's trademark
"MovieBuff' was the senior mark and that West Coast's registered domain name
"moviebuff.com" was the junior mark before turning its attention to the likelihood of confusion
analysis. Id.
86. Id. at 1062.
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differences between the confusion generated by visible domain names and
invisible metatags. 87 Therefore, the court performed a separate likelihood of
confusion analysis for West Coast's metatag use.
88
Addressing the application of initial interest confusion to metatag use, the
court stated that many customers who were looking for Brookfield's
MovieBuff products, but were instead taken to West Coast's website, "will
simply decide to utilize West Coast's offerings instead."8 9 The court further
found that "[a]lthough there is no [actual] source confusion . .. there is
nevertheless initial interest confusion... [and] West Coast improperly benefits
from the goodwill that Brookfield developed in its mark."' 9  Therefore, the
court held that using another's trademark in one's own metatags was likely to
cause initial interest confusion and was trademark infringement under the
Lanham Act.
91
In the same year as Brookfield, the Ninth Circuit revisited the initial interest
confusion doctrine in Interstellar Starship Services Ltd. v. Epix, Inc.
(Interstellar Startship 1).92 In that case, the district court granted summary
judgment for Interstellar Starship Services, a computer graphics company,
holding that its maintenance of the domain name "epix.com" did not infringe
Epix's trademark.93 On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit discussed the value
of the initial interest confusion doctrine, stating that it "permits a finding of a
likelihood of confusion although the consumer quickly becomes aware of the
source's actual identity and no purchase is made as a result of confusion."
94
Although this case was later remanded based on a summary judgment issue,
the court recognized that initial interest confusion was a viable trademark
theory in an Internet case.
95
As the Internet became an integral part of the business world, a growing
number of trademark cases recognized this phenomenon, and began to apply
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. Id. The court astutely analogized using a well-known trademark in one's metatags to,
"posting a sign with another's trademark in front of one's store." Id. at 1064.
91. Id. at 1066 (stating that initial interest confusion is one type of confusion that
"trademark laws are designed to prevent").
92. 184 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1999), affd, 304 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2002).
93. Id. at 1108-09.
94. Id. at 1110 (citing Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1061-64; Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus
Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 257-58 (2d Cir. 1987)).
95. See id at 1108, 1110. The court held that summary judgment was improper because
there were still genuine issues of material fact that needed to be weighed by the district court. Id.
at 1111-12. On remand, a bench trial was conducted and the district court held that the
defendant's "past use of epix.com" infringed on plaintiff's trademark. Interstellar Starship
Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc. (Interstellar Starship I1), 304 F.3d 936, 940 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in
original) (summarizing the district court's holding). Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit found no
likelihood of initial interest confusion in this case. Id. at 946.
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the initial interest confusion doctrine. 96 In PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan
Technologies, L.L. C., Telescan brought an action for declaratory judgment on
the question of whether its activities infringed PACCAR's trademarks;
PACCAR counterclaimed for, among other things, trademark infringement
under the Lanham Act, and also moved for a preliminary injunction. 97
PACCAR's claims centered on TeleScan's use of PACCAR trademarks in its
domain names, such as "wwww.peterbilttrucks.com," and in its use of
"Peterbilt" and "Kenworth" in its metatags. 98 The district court granted
PACCAR's preliminary injunction and TeleScan appealed. 99 On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit analyzed the domain name
trademark infringement claim separately from the metatag use claim under an
initial interest confusion theory. 0 Regarding TeleScan's use of PACCAR's
trademarks in its domain names, the court stated that a "disclaimer disavowing
affiliation" on a webpage comes too late to prevent initial interest confusion.
101
Considering TeleScan's metatag use, however, the Sixth Circuit remanded the
case because the trial court failed to perform a separate likelihood of confusion
analysis. 102 Nevertheless, initial interest confusion played a significant role in
the outcome of this case.03
In 2003, the Ninth Circuit strengthened the initial interest confusion doctrine
in Horphag Research Ltd. v. Pellegrini. 104 Horphag Research brought an
action for trademark infringement against the defendant, Garcia, after Garcia
used Horphag's word, "pycnogenol," on Garcia's website; Horphag claimed
unauthorized use of its trademark. 105 Garcia admitted to using Horphag's
trademark on his website and in metatags, 10 6 but claimed that these uses were
for comparison purposes only, asserting a classic fair-use defense. 107
96. See, e.g., Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062.
97. PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 247-48 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting
that PACCAR is a popular manufacturer of large trucks, and is more commonly known under its
main trademarks: "Peterbilt" and "Kenworth"). PACCAR also brought federal claims for "unfair
competition, false designation of origin, and trademark dilution." Id.
98. Id. at 247-48.
99. Id. at 248-49.
100. 1dat254,258.
101. Id. at 253 (citing cases from the Seventh Circuit, Ninth Circuit, and the Northern District
of Iowa).
102. Id. at 258 (holding that the scope of the injunction was "too broad").
103. See id at 253-55 (discussing confusion regarding similarity of domain names and
Telescan's ineffective disclaimer).
104. See 337 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 2003).
105. Id. at 1039.
106. Id. at 1039-40. The court wrote that the defendant, Garcia, was "an entrepreneur who
has used the Internet site 'healthierlife.com,' among others, to advertise and sell various
pharmaceutical products, including 'Pycnogenol' and 'Masquelier's: the original French
Pycnogenol"' (a generic French version of Pycnogenol). Id. at 1039.
107. Id. at 1039-41. The defense of fair use will stand even if there is actual confusion or
likelihood of confusion. See Cosmetically Sealed Indus. v. Chesebrough-Pond's USA Co., 125
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Nevertheless, because any reference to Horphag's trademark "spawn[s]
confusion as to sponsorship and attempt[s] to appropriate the cachet of the
trademark . . . to his product," the court held that the defendant infringed
Horphag's trademark under an initial interest confusion theory.'0 8
In addition to the Ninth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit has continued to develop
the initial interest confusion doctrine. In 2006, the Sixth Circuit once again
applied the initial interest confusion doctrine in the domain name case, Audi
AG v. D'Amato. 109 In that case, D'Amato used the website
"www.audisport.com" to sell products such as shirts and hats that displayed
Audi's trademarks. 110 The court held that D'Amato's use of Audi's domain
name infringed Audi's trademarks under the likelihood of confusion test,
finding that the applicable factors were satisfied."' The court also addressed
D'Amato's main defense, that any customer confusion would be dispelled by
the site's posted disclaimer. 112 Relying on its decision in PACCAR, the court
held that a disclaimer on a website appears too late to prevent initial interest
confusion and, is therefore not a valid defense.113
2. Playboy's Exception to the Brookfield Rule
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged a possible exception to the initial interest
confusion doctrine when it decided Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape
F.3d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Fair use is a defense to liability under the Lanham Act even if a
defendant's conduct would otherwise constitute infringement of another's trademark.").
108. Horphag, 337 F.3d at 1041. The court also found that defendant's infringement was
"willful and deliberate" justifying an award of attorneys' fees under the Lanham Act. Id. at 1042
(citing the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000), which provides that "a court may award the
prevailing party reasonable attorneys' fees in exceptional circumstances . . . [which include cases
of] malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, or willful [infringement]").
109. 469 F.3d 534, 546 (6th Cir. 2006).
110. Id. at 539, 544. After receiving several cease and desist letters from Audi, D'Amato
claims that he "removed references to all approved page designs, all logos developed, and content
posted having Audi Trademarks (AUDI, AUDI FOUR RINGS, and QUATTRO) such that, as a
result, audisport.com appeared in a noncommercial way." Id. at 540 (internal quotation marks
omitted). In addition, "the website informed visitors 'this page is not associated with Audi AG or
Audi USA in any way."' Id. at 541. Nevertheless, the court found that "www.audisport.com
continued to have some commercial purpose" because it was "still offering to sell advertising
space on the website." Id.
111. Id. at 542-45.
112. Id. at 546. The disclaimer stated, "[t]his page is not associated with Audi GmbH or
Audi USA in any way." Id (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
113. Id. The court further found that "any effect this disclaimer had in reducing confusion
would likely be negated by the statement on the website contending that there was a 'signed
agreement' with Audi." Id. Likewise, "[e]ven 'minimal' advertisements constitute use of the
owner's trademark in connection with the advertising of the goods, which the Lanham Act
proscribes." Id.
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Communications Corp. in 2004.114 Playboy involved Netscape's use of the
trademarks "playboy" and "playmate" to create keyword banner
advertisements on its search engine. 1 5 Playboy appealed a summary judgment
decision for Netscape on claims of trademark infringement and dilution."
6
The Ninth Circuit noted that Playboy's "strongest argument for a likelihood of
confusion is . . . initial interest confusion" under the theory set forth in
Brookfield.117 However, the court articulated an exception to the initial interest
confusion doctrine: "[I]f a banner advertisement clearly identified its source or,
even better, overtly compared [plaintiffs] products to the sponsor's own, no
confusion would occur under [the initial interest confusion] theory.""' 8 Thus,
even if a defendant uses a competitor's trademark to advertise on the Internet,
there is no initial interest confusion if the source of the advertisement is clearlyS119
identified or the ad overtly compares both companies.
Today, the holdings in Brookfield and Playboy remain in tension, and courts
must determine whether the trademark "use" at issue falls under the general
rule, or the Playboy exception. 12  In recent cases, district courts have devoted
a great deal of their analyses to determining which rule applies. 121
114. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1025 n.16, 1030 &
n.43 (9th Cir. 2004); see also id. at 1034-36 (Berzon, J., concurring) (stating that the holding in
Brookfield is overbroad).
115. Id at 1022-23 (majority opinion). Netscape used more than 400 keyword terms that
related to adult-oriented entertainment in its practice of keying, which included the plaintiff's
trademarks. Id. at 1023. The court explained that "[k]eying allows advertisers to target
individuals with certain interests by linking advertisements to pre-identified terms." Id. at 1022.
Furthermore, keyed "[a]dvertisements appearing on search results pages are called 'banner ads'
because they run along the top or side of a page much like a banner." Id. at 1023.
116. Id. at 1022.
117. Id. at 1024-25 (citing Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d
1036, 1057, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 1999)).
118. Id. at 1025 n. 16, 1030 & n.43. Judge Berzon also questioned the holding in Brookfield
in her concurring opinion. Id. at 1034-36 (Berzon, J., concurring) ("I do not think it is reasonable
to find initial interest confusion when a consumer is never confused as to source or affiliation, but
instead knows, or should know, from the outset that a product or web link is not related to that of
the trademark holder because the list produced by the search engine so informs him.").
Ultimately, the case was reversed and remanded because of the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Id. at 1034.
119. See id. at 1025 n.16, 1030 & n.43 (majority opinion).
120. See, e.g., Picture It Sold, Inc. v. iSOLD IT, L.L.C., 199 F. App'x 631, 634 (9th Cir.
2006).
121. E.g., Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper, No. 03-5340, 2007 WL 1159950, at *4-6,
10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007) (discussing the existing Ninth Circuit precedent and the unsettled
question regarding "the future application of the initial interest confusion doctrine to identified,
sponsored links"); see also Rhino Sports, Inc. v. Sport Court, Inc., No. CV-02-1815, 2007 WL
1302745, at *7 (D. Ariz. May 2, 2007) (examining the current state of the law in various federal
courts on the issue, "trademark keyword purchase and initial interest confusion," and holding that
the "most relevant Ninth Circuit decisions" are Brookfield and Playboy).
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D. Applying Initial Interest Confusion to Keyed Advertising
As noted previously, the initial interest confusion doctrine has been applied
to Internet cases involving domain names, metatags, and banner
advertisements. 122 The most recent cases examine whether purchasing keyed
advertising'2 3 is sufficiently analogous to the metatag and domain name cases,
and thus forbidden, or whether it is exempted because the ad clearly identifies
its source as in Playboy.
124
In Picture It Sold, Inc. v. iSOLD IT, L.L.C., the Ninth Circuit articulated this
difficult issue as: "whether [purchasing keyed advertising on another's
trademark] is sufficiently analogous to metatag use so as to be prohibited by
Brookfield... or whether the activity might fall within the possible exception
to Brookfield ... suggested in [Playboy]."' 5 Picture It Sold!, Inc. (Picture It
Sold) appealed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction against
iSOLD IT, L.L.C. 126 The injunction sought to enjoin iSOLD IT from "buying
keyword advertising on Picture It Sold's own name and colorable limitations
thereof."127 Due to the limited nature of the record, the court held that there
was "insufficient evidence that I Sold It ha[d] used or purchased keyword
advertising on that phrase."' 28  In a footnote, the court noted that it had
"received a post-argument submission" from Picture It Sold that purported to
show iSOLD IT "indeed purchas[ed] advertising on its trademark at some
point in the past.' 29 On remand, however, the parties settled. 3 °
Picture It Sold is not the only case that has addressed the Brookfield-
Playboy tension; another keyed-advertising case that recognized the initial
interest confusion theory was Government Employees Insurance Co. v.
Google, Inc. (GEICO/ )."' Government Employees Insurance Co. (GEICO)
brought an action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia for trademark infringement against Google for using GEICO's
122. See, e.g., PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 247-48 (6th Cir.
2003) (involving both unlawful domain name and metatag use).
123. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
124. Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1025 n.16, 1030 & n.43 (noting that when a banner advertisement
or search engine clearly identifies its source, "[d]oing so might eliminate the likelihood of initial
interest confusion that exists").
125. Picture It Sold, 199 F. App'x at 634.
126. Id. at632 n.3.
127. Id. at633.
128. Id. at 633 (emphasis omitted). The Ninth Circuit also rejected Picture It Sold's
argument that, based on iSOLD IT's declarations and search engine result lists, the court may
infer that iSOLD IT purchased keyword advertising on Picture It Sold's name. Id.
129. Id. at 633-34 & n.4. The court went on to state that "the evidence is not part of the
current record, and this evidence ... must be laid before the district court for its determination."
Id. at 634 n.4.
130. Notice of Tentative Settlement at 1, Picture It Sold, Inc. v. iSOLD IT, L.L.C., No. C-05-
2598 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2007).
131. 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 703-04 (E.D. Va. 2004).
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trademarks as keywords on Google's advertising program. 132 Google was
generating sponsored-link advertisements with the unauthorized use of
GEICO's trademarks.1 33 In addressing the threshold question, the court first
analyzed whether GEICO had sufficiently alleged "use in commerce" under
the Lanham Act.1 34 Upon finding that GEICO had done so, the court denied
that portion of Google's motion to dismiss.135 The court stated that "[w]here
keyword placement of. . . advertising is being sold, the portals and search
engines are taking advantage of the drawing power and goodwill of these
famous marks."'
36
In addition to proving use in commerce, GEICO was also required to prove
likelihood of confusion. 137 GEICO argued, and the court agreed, that the
traditional likelihood of confusion test did not apply.138 Rather, GEICO argued
that the court should use the initial interest confusion doctrine established in
Brookfield.139 Despite the court applying the initial interest confusion doctrine,
GEICO failed to provide sufficient evidence that Google used GEICO's
trademark as a keyword for "[s]ponsored [1links that do not reference GEICO's
marks in their headings or text." While trademark infringement was not
found because of a lack of evidence, initial interest confusion was recognized
by the court as a viable trademark theory for keyed advertising cases.'14
1
Despite the holdings of the Ninth Circuit and the Eastern District of
Virginia, many courts have held that keyed advertising does not clear the "use
in commerce" threshold under the Lanham Act. 142 In 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v.
132. Id. at 701-02. The court explained that Google "sell[s] advertising linked to search
terms, so that when a consumer enters a particular search term, the results page displays not only
a list of Websites generated by ... using neutral and objective criteria, but also links to websites
of paid advertisers (listed as 'Sponsored Links')." Id. at 702.
133. Id. at 701-02.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000) (requiring "use[] in commerce" in a cause of action for
trademark infringement); id § 1127 (defining "use in commerce" as the "bona fide use of a mark
in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark").
135. GEICO I, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 702, 704, 706.
136. Id. at 704 (citation omitted).
137. Id.
138. Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc. (GEICO I), No. 1:04CV507, 2005 WL
1903128, at *1, 4 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005) (providing more explanation for the court's decision in
GEICO I regarding defendant's motion to dismiss, and noting that the likelihood of confusion test
varies from case to case because "not all factors are relevant in every case").
139. Id. at *4. The court further noted that the initial interest confusion doctrine recognizes
that the risk on the internet is that "the user will be satisfied with the second site or sufficiently
distracted that he will not arrive at or return to the site for which he was originally searching." Id.
140. Id. at *7. However, GEICO provided sufficient evidence, in the form of surveys, "to
establish a likelihood of confusion regarding those Sponsored Links in which the trademark
GEICO appears either in the heading or text of the ad." Id.
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 408-09 (2d Cir.
2005) (holding that the internal use of a trademark does not constitute trademark infringement
[Vol. 58:535
The Need for the Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine
WhenU com, Inc., the Second Circuit considered whether an Internet marketing
company infringed 1-800 Contacts's trademark by using the mark to trigger
pop-up advertising. 43 WhenU.com's program called "SaveNow" generated
pop-up ads of 1-800 Contacts's competitors when Internet users accessed 1-
800's website. 144 However, WhenU.com's clients were not granted access to
its directory of keywords that triggered the clients' pop-up ads, "nor [did
WhenU.com] permit these clients to request or purchase specified keywords to
[be] add[ed] to the directory."' 145 The court held that "[a] company's internal
utilization of a trademark in a way that does not communicate it to the public
... simply does not violate the Lanham Act."'
146
In Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the trademark
use at issue was "internal utilization," and thus not "use in commerce" under
the Lanham Act. 14 7 In Merck, the defendants, six Canadian online pharmacies,
identified and sold their products as "generic ZOCOR."' 14 8 Several defendants
also purchased sponsored links from Google and Yahoo on Merck's "ZOCOR"
trademark. 149 Noting the decision in 1-800 Contacts, the Southern District of
New York held that defendants' use of Merck's trademark in keyed advertising
was merely "internal use" and thus not trademark infringement under the
Lanham Act.
150
In Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., the United States District Court for the
Northern District of New York reached a similar result on the "use in
commerce" threshold issue. 15 1 Rescuecom alleged trademark infringement
based on Google's sale of its mark "Rescuecom" as a keyword that triggered
sponsored links. 152 Google argued that its actions did not constitute trademark
"use" under the Lanham Act. Citing 1-800 Contacts and Merck, the court
under the Lanham Act). Besides the Second Circuit, both the Northern and Southern Federal
District Courts of New York have held that keyed advertising is not use in commerce. See infra
notes 147-54 and accompanying text for discussion of these cases.
143. 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 402.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 409.
146. Id. (concluding that "WhenU's inclusion of the 1-800 website address in its SaveNow
directory does not infringe on 1-800's trademark").
147. Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 415-16
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
148. Id. at 406. Zocor is a popular cholesterol medication. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 415-16. The court also noted that it was "significant that defendants actually
[sold] Zocor ... on their websites." Id.
151. See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 403 (N.D.N.Y. 2006).
152. Id. at 395-96.
153. Id.
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held that "[Google's] internal use of plaintiff's trademark to trigger sponsored
links is not [use in commerce] within the meaning of the Lanham Act."
1 54
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California, in
Google, Inc. v. American Blind & Wallpaper, recently examined all of the
existing precedent on "use in commerce."' 155  The case involved Google's
alleged sale of trademarked terms that triggered keyed advertisements on its
search engine.1 56 Google brought an action for declaratory judgment, arguing
that it did not infringe American Blind's trademarks when it used them to
trigger sponsored links on Google's AdWords program. 57 After holding that
"the sale of trademarked terms in [Google's] AdWords program is ... use in
commerce for the purposes of the Lanham Act,"'' 58 the court focused on the
likelihood of confusion test and the initial interest confusion doctrine.' As a
result of the court's denial of a motion for summary judgment on the "use in
commerce" issue, 160 American Blind's trademark infringement claim was
allowed to go to trial on an initial interest confusion theory.'
6 1
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania also
addressed the "use in commerce" issue in J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C. Ltd.
Partnership v. Settlement Funding LLC.162 Plaintiff, J.G. Wentworth, brought
an action for trademark infringement against defendant, Peachtree Settlement
154. Id. at 403. The court was able to reach this conclusion, because "there [wa]s no
allegation that defendant placed plaintiff's trademark on any goods, containers, displays, or
advertisements, or that its internal use was visible to the public." Id.
155. See Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc. (Am. Blind), No. C 03-5340,
2007 WL 1159950, at *2-6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007).
156. Id. at*1.
157. Id. Google's AdWords program offers "keyword-triggered advertising" that "enables
advertisers to purchase or bid on certain keywords." Rhino Sports, Inc. v. Sport Court, Inc., No.
CV-02-1815, 2007 WL 1302745, at *2 (D. Ariz. May 2, 2007). Then, when a consumer "enters
those keywords in Google's search engine, the program will yield both 'Sponsored' and organic
results," the sponsored results being links to the paying advertisers' webpages. Id. at *2.
Google's AdWords program also offers several "matching options" allowing purchasers to
control how and when their sponsored links will appear in response to an internet user's Google
search. Id.
158. Am. Blind, 2007 WL 1159950, at *6. The court began its analysis by considering the
recent developments in Merck and Rescuecom. Id. at *2-3. The court then turned to the existing
Ninth Circuit precedent in Playboy, and concluded that the Ninth Circuit made "an implicit
finding of trademark use in commerce in the manner at issue here." Id. at *4-5. The court stated
that, "[w]hile the Second Circuit's decision in 1-800 Contacts and the subsequent district court
decisions may cause the Ninth Circuit to consider this issue explicitly, the lengthy discussions of
likelihood of confusion in Brookfield and Playboy would have been unnecessary in the absence of
actionable trademark use." Id. at *6.
159. ld.at*7-10&n.21.
160. Id. at *6.
161. See id. at *10-11 (holding that while two of plaintiff's claims must be dismissed on
summary judgment, all other claims, including trademark infringement, are to proceed).
162. No. 06-0597, 2007 WL 30115, at *2, *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007) (addressing defendant's
use of plaintiff's trademark in Google's AdWords program and metatags).
[Vol. 58:535
The Need for the Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine
Funding, based on its use of plaintiffs trademark in two ways. 16 3 First, J.G.
Wentworth alleged that Peachtree used its trademarks as keywords in Google's
AdWords program to trigger sponsored links appearing near J.G. Wentworth's
link.164 Second, J.G. Wentworth alleged that Peachtree used its trademarks as
"keyword [metatags] for its website.", 65
In its determination of whether Peachtree committed trademark
infringement, the court considered whether the purchase and use of J.G.
Wentworth's trademarks as keywords "constitute[d] the type of 'use in
commerce' contemplated by the Lanham Act."'1 66 Peachtree argued that its use
was non-trademark in nature because it was "analogous to drug manufacturers'
practices of purchasing rights to display [their] generic products next to name
brand competitors' products on a drug store shelf."' 6 7 The court disagreed and
held that Peachtree's "participation in Google's AdWords program and [its
use] of plaintiffs marks in its keyword meta tags constitute[d] trademark use
under the Lanham Act." 168 Despite finding use in commerce, the court
ultimately granted defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that J.G. Wentworth
did not allege "any actionable likelihood of confusion under the Lanham
Act." 169  The court expressly disagreed with the Brookfield decision and
criticized the reasoning as a "material mischaracterization of the operation of
Internet search engines. ' 7  Further, the court did not find initial interest
confusion, stating that, "[d]ue to the separate and distinct nature of the links
... potential customers have no opportunity to confuse defendant's services,
goods, advertisements, links or websites for those of plaintiff."
17
'
Despite the rejection of the initial interest confusion doctrine by some
courts, the Ninth Circuit has continued to adhere to the approach in the context
of keyword advertising. District courts in the Ninth Circuit have most recently
163. Id. at *1. J.G. Wentworth also brought claims for "false representation, trademark
dilution, . . . injury to business representation, . . . [and] Pennsylvania state law claims of
trademark infringement and unfair competition." Id.
164. Id. at *2. However, "plaintiff does not allege that defendant's advertisements and links
incorporate plaintiff's marks in any way." Id.
165. Id
166. Id. at *4.
167. Id.
168. Id. at *4-6 ("While recognizing that participation in Google's AdWords program is
certainly not traditional 'use in commerce' under prior applications of the Lanham Act, in the
context of this new technology the [New Jersey] Court held that such acts satisffied] the Lanham
Act's 'use' requirement." (quoting Buying for the Home, LLC v. Humble Abode, LLC, 459 F.
Supp. 2d 310, 322 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
169. Id. at *6.
170. Id. at *7 ("At no point are potential customers 'taken by a search engine' to defendant's
website due to defendant's use of plaintiffs marks in meta tags."). The court based its decision
on the fact that each link was listed separately and distinctly, and did not "incorporate plaintiffs
marks in any way discernable to internet users and potential customers." Id.
171. Id.at*6.
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addressed the "use in commerce" issue. 172 In Rhino Sports, Inc. v. Sport
Court, Inc., both the plaintiff and defendant were involved in the recreational
flooring business. 173 Rhino Sports filed a motion to modify its permanent
injunction, arguing that "the law and/or facts" had changed sufficiently to
justify modification. 174 The court held that there had been no significant
change in the initial interest confusion doctrine in the Ninth Circuit to justify
modification of the permanent injunction, 175 disregarding Rhino Sports'
argument that many courts have held that there is no "actionable likelihood of
confusion" for Google's AdWords program. 17 6 Instead, the court concluded
that the decisions in Brookfield and Playboy did not indicate that the law in the
Ninth Circuit had changed "significantly" to justify modification of the
permanent injunction. 177 Thus, although various circuits have addressed
whether keyed advertising constitutes trademark infringement under the initial
interest confusion doctrine, their holdings have not been consistent on the
issue.
II. PURCHASING KEYED ADVERTISING IS ANALOGOUS TO METATAG USE
A. Threshold Issue: "Use in Commerce"
Before answering the question posed in Picture It Sold,178 one must address
whether using a trademark as a search term in keyed advertising is "use in
172. See, e.g., Rhino Sports, Inc. v. Sport Court, Inc., No. CV-02-1815, 2007 WL 1302745,
at * I (D. Ariz. May 2, 2007).
173. Id. A complex procedural history culminated in a settlement agreement and permanent
injunction against Rhino Sports. Id. The permanent injunction, in pertinent part, enjoined Rhino
Sports from:
directly or indirectly using in commerce the mark SPORT COURT, or any other words,
marks, or phrases confusingly similar thereto ... in connection with the Internet, such
as in an Internet domain name, as a sponsored link, in connection with an Internet web
page, or as HTML code for an Internet website in any manner, such as the title or
keyword portions of a metatag, or otherwise.
Id. Sport Court then filed a petition to reopen the case and a new complaint alleging that Rhino
Sports had violated the permanent injunction. Id.
174. Id. at *2.
175. Id. at *6-8. With regard to the Rhino Sports' alleged violation of the permanent
injunction, the court held that Sport Court failed to produce any evidence that Rhino Sports, did
in fact, purchase any keyed advertising on the trademark "Sport Court." Id. at *4-5.
176. Id. at *7 (referencing J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C. Ltd. P'ship v. Settlement Funding LLC,
No. 06-597, 2007 WL 30115, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007)).
177. Id. at *7-8. While the court characterized the state of the law in the Ninth Circuit as
"uncertain," it held that "a finding of a significant change by this Court would be premature and
ill-advised." Id. at *7. The court further noted that "while other courts have ruled that keyword
use of a trademark does not constitute 'use' in commerce under the Lanham Act, the Ninth
Circuit has not squarely addressed this issue." Id at *8.
178. Picture It Sold, Inc. v. iSOLD IT, LLC., 199 F. App'x 631, 633-34 & n.4 (9th Cir.
2006) ("Whether [the purchase of keyed advertising by a competitor] is sufficiently analogous to
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commerce" under the Lanham Act.179 Although not a formal circuit split,
several courts in the Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits disagree on
what "use in commerce" is.'
8 0
Under Second Circuit precedent, the "internal utilization" of a trademark is
not "use in commerce" under the Lanham Act.' 81 The definition of "use in
commerce" in the Lanham Act supports this position because of its exclusive
reference to: (1) use of the mark in the form of tags, displays, and containers,
when sold or transported in commerce; and (2) use on services when displayed
with the sale or advertising of services rendered in commerce. 82 For example,
the defendant in J.G. Wentworth unsuccessfully argued that purchasing keyed
advertising is "analogous to drug manufacturers' practices of purchasing rights
to place its generic products next to name brand competitors' products on a
drug store shelf," and thus not "use in commerce."'
' 83
Conversely, in Playboy, the Ninth Circuit rested its lengthy likelihood of
confusion analysis on an "implicit finding of trademark use in commerce.' 84
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania in J.G. Wentworth also held that
purchasing keyed advertising through Google's AdWords program, and using
trademarks as keyword metatags, was use in commerce under the Lanham
metatag use so as to be prohibited [under the initial interest confusion doctrine]."); see also supra
note 37 and accompanying text.
179. See J. Patrick Norris, Comment, The Sale of Internet Keywords: Trademark
Infringement Actionable Under the Lanham Act?, 2 CHARLESTON L. REv. 889, 907 (2008)
(arguing that keyed advertising is "use in commerce" under the Lanham Act); see also Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (defining use in commerce); 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com,
Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 407-12 (2d Cir. 2005) (conducting a use-in-commerce analysis of WhenU's
"SaveNow" directory and its pop-up ads); Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc.
(Am. Blind), No. C. 03-5340, 2007 WL 1159950, at *2-6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007) (finding that
the sale of trademark terms is use in commerce).
180. Compare 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 407-09 (holding that the internal utilization of a
trademark is not use in commerce under the Lanham Act), with Am. Blind, 2007 WL 1159950, at
*6 (holding that the sale of trademarks in Google's AdWords program constitutes use in
commerce under the Lanham Act), J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C. Ltd. P'ship v. Settlement Funding
LLC, No. 06-0597, 2007 WL 30115, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007) (finding that Settlement
Funding's actions had "crossed the line from internal use to use in commerce"), and Gov't
Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc. (GEICO I1), No. 1:04 CV 507, 2005 WL 1903128, at *3 (E.D.
Va. Aug. 8, 2005) (finding that GEICO had "sufficiently alleged that [Google's] use was in
commerce" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
181. 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 409; see also supra Part 1.D (discussing how the "internal
utilization" of trademarks does not constitute "use in commerce" in the 1-800 Contacts, Merck,
and Rescuecom cases).
182. See supra note 51 for the definition of "use in commerce" under the Lanham Act.
183. See J.G. Wentworth, 2007 WL 30115, at *4 (summarizing the argument in defendant's
motion to dismiss).
184. See Am. Blind, 2007 WL 1159950, at *5; see also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape
Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1026-31 (9th Cir. 2004) (conducting a full likelihood of
confusion analysis and examining defendant's only three defenses: "fair use, nominal use, and
functional use").
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Act. 185 Moreover, both the Northern District of California in American Blind
and the Eastern District of Virginia in GEICO H held that Google's sale of
trademarked terms in its AdWords program was "use in commerce" under the
Lanham Act. 186 Thus, the outcome of any future case concerning this issue
rests on whether the particular court applies Second, Third, Fourth, or Ninth
Circuit precedent.'
87
Although the courts are split over whether the unauthorized use and
purchase of a trademark in keyed advertising is "use in commerce" under the
Lanham Act, courts in the Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have all answered
in the affirmative.' 88 This interpretation of "use in commerce" is consistent
with the Supreme Court's view that the "use in commerce" requirement should
be "construed liberally" to encompass a range of behavior. 189 Nevertheless, a
complete analysis of the scope of "use of commerce" is outside the scope of
this Comment; therefore, the remainder of this Comment adopts the Third,
Fourth, and Ninth Circuit view that the unauthorized use and purchase of a
trademark in keyed advertising satisfies the Lanham Act's "use in commerce"
threshold.1 90
B. The Question Presented in Picture It Sold
Even once it is assumed that keyed advertising is "use in commerce," the
Picture It Sold issue still remains: whether purchasing keyed advertising on
another's trademark is sufficiently analogous to metatag use to be trademark
infringement under an initial interest confusion theory. 91 If so, it should be
prohibited by the Brookfield decision under the theory of initial interest
confusion, 192unless the facts allow the defendant to invoke the Playboy
185. J.G. Wentworth, 2007 WL 30115, at *6.
186. Am. Blind, 2007 WL 1159950, at *6; GEICO II, 2005 WL 1903128, at *3.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 180-86.
188. See Am. Blind, 2007 WL 1159950, at *2-6 (applying Ninth Circuit precedent); J.G.
Wentworth, 2007 WL 30115, at *3-4 (applying Third Circuit precedent); GEICO II, 2005 WL
1903128, at *3 (applying Fourth Circuit precedent).
189. See Finance Express L.L.C. v. Nowcom Corp., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1172 (C.D. Cal.
2008) ("The Supreme Court has held that the 'in commerce' requirement should be construed
liberally because the Lanham Act 'confers broad jurisdictional powers upon the courts of the
United States."' (quoting Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 283 (1952))).
190. This assumption is necessary because solving the circuit split is beyond the scope of this
Comment and could be the exclusive focus of another article. See, e.g., Norris, supra note 179, at
907-08 (arguing that keyed advertising is "use in commerce," and that the Lanham Act should be
extended to redress the infringement in these cases). However, many commentators fall short of
describing why the initial interest confusion doctrine is the proper doctrine to redress this issue
and how it should be applied. See id
191. Picture It Sold, Inc. v. iSOLD IT, L.L.C., 199 F. App'x 631, 634 (9th Cir. 2006).
192. See Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 (9th
Cir. 1999) (extending the initial interest confusion doctrine to metatag use).
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exception.193 This issue was never decided in Picture It Sold.194 In order to
answer the question, one must take a closer look at: (1) how the courts treat the
initial interest confusion doctrine in light of the greater likelihood of confusion
test; and (2) the current state of the law in cases where keyed advertising is at
issue.
Some courts analyze initial interest confusion within one of the traditional
likelihood of confusion factors,' 95 yet other courts analyze it without using the
likelihood of confusion test at all. 196 Regardless of which analysis is used, for
a court to find trademark infringement under the initial interest confusion
doctrine it must conduct a full likelihood of confusion analysis. 9 While
initial interest confusion is not a stand-alone trademark theory, it can be used
as evidence of actual confusion or as an additional factor for consideration by
the court.'
9 8
Second, the posture of Picture It Sold was different than other recent keyed
advertising and search engine cases. The parties in many of those cases were
search engine companies themselves, rather than the true infringers-the
private parties who actually purchased the trademark keywords. 199 Very few
cases address the factual situation in Picture it Sold, which involved a business
competitor's purchase of sponsored links on another's trademark. 200
Moreover, those cases that do address the question presented either do not
reach the likelihood of confusion test in their analyses because they never pass
the threshold "use in commerce" inquiry, 20 1 or simply dispose of the issue
without any formal analysis at all. 202 No case formally answers the question
193. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1025 n.16 (9th
Cir. 2004) (carving out an exception to the initial interest confusion doctrine where banner
advertisements or website links "clearly identifly] its source" or overtly compare products).
194. See Picture It Sold, 199 F. App'x at 634 (holding, on the limited record, that a ruling on
this issue "would be premature").
195. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 1987)
(analyzing initial interest confusion under the likely degree of customer sophistication prong).
196. See, e.g., Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1024-25 (discussing initial interest confusion separately
from its likelihood of confusion analysis).
197. See Perfumebay.com Inc. v. Ebay Inc., 506 F.3d 1165, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007). In
Perfumebay.com the court stated that a full likelihood of confusion analysis is necessary even
when the trademark infringement theory being advanced is the initial interest confusion theory.
Id. at 1176.
198. See AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49, 352-53 (9th Cir. 1979) (listing
evidence of actual confusion as one factor of the likelihood of confusion test).
199. See, e.g., Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc. (Am. Blind), No. C-03-
5340, 2007 WL 1159950, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007).
200. See Picture It Sold, 199 F. App'x at 633 & n.3.
201. See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 415-
16 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (disposing of the trademark infringement claim based on its "use in
commerce" holding).
202. See J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C. Ltd. P'ship v. Settlement Funding LLC, No. 06-0597, 2007
WL 30115, at *6-8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007). Here the court conducted no likelihood of confusion
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posed in Picture it Sold.2 0 3  Thus, the problem remains: Does trademark
infringement occur when someone purchases keyed advertising on another's
protected mark?
2°4
Like metatag use, keyed advertising accomplishes the goal of getting one's
sponsored link as close as possible to a competitor's link. This suggests that
companies use keyed advertising for the same purpose as metatags: to
deceive.206 Unlike comparative advertising by the pharmaceutical industry,
207
the major reason why companies purchase keyed advertising on a competitor's
trademark is to lure unaware Internet users to their websites.20 8 This confusion
attracts Internet users-who are looking for one specific website-to a
209competitor's website, much like in the initial Audi-Infinity hypothetical.
Not only are these techniques "use in commerce" under the Lanham Act, but
they are also deceptive advertising methods.21 °
Companies can still purchase keyed advertising by using keywords that
encompass generic and descriptive terms which do not include a competitor's
trademark, such as "car," and "luxury sports car. ''211 However, when someone
other than the trademark owner purchases keyed advertising on the owner's
trademark, that action, just like metatag use, should be considered trademark
212infringement when likelihood of confusion is also found. This does notmean that this analysis should apply in the following factual situations: (1)
test, listed none of the traditional factors, and did not give any reason for its holding other than
"respectfully disagree[ing] with the Ninth Circuit's conclusion in Brookfield ... find[ing it] to be
a material mischaracterization of the operation of intemet search engines." Id. at *7.
203. See supra Part I.B-C.
204. See Picture It Sold, 199 F. App'x at 633-34.
205. Shea, supra note 2, at 529 ("Using trademarks as keywords gives companies the benefit
of placing their ad on a web page along with the link to their competitor's website. This strategy
can be a good way to reach consumers because the advertiser knows that if a consumer enters a
competitor's trademark as a keyword, the consumer is someone interested in that type of product
or service.").
206. See Zweihom, supra note 30, at 1362-64 (discussing the decline of metatag use and its
replacement with keyed advertising).
207. See Pediamed Pharms., Inc. v. Breckenridge Pharm., Inc., 419 F. Supp. 2d 714, 729-30
(D. Md. 2006) (discussing a case in which a maker of generic drugs claimed no intent to deceive
because its products contained the same active ingredients as the name-brand drug).
208. See J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C. Ltd. P'ship v. Settlement Funding LLC, No. 06-0597, 2007
WL 30115, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007); see also Steel, supra note 1 ("For large companies, the
frustration comes when their names and other well-known phrases are used in the text of a search
ad leading to an unrelated site.").
209. See supra p. 535.
210. See, e.g., J.G. Wentworth, 2007 WL 30115, at *5-6.
211. See, e.g., Rhino Sports, Inc. v. Sport Court, Inc., CV-02-1815, 2007 WL 1302745, at *5
(D. Ariz. May 2, 2007) ("With regard to keyword purchasing, the permanent injunction serves as
no bar to Rhino Sports' use of any generic terms such as 'courts' or 'basketball court.').
212. See Perfumebay.com Inc. v. Ebay Inc., 506 F.3d 1165, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding
that, under the initial interest confusion doctrine, there must still be a finding of likelihood of
confusion).
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when a company such as Google uses a trademark in the way that the
defendant in 1-800 Contacts did; or (2) where a company clearly identifies a
triggered banner advertisement like the exception articulated in Playboy.214 In
both situations, although there is some intent to generate initial interest, there is
no confusion (actual or otherwise) to sustain a claim of trademark infringement
under the likelihood of confusion test.
21 5
Therefore, because metatags were once used to get a website listed on a
search engine, 216 and now companies have circumvented that system by
purchasing keyed advertising, 217 the intent of alleged trademark infringers is
"sufficiently analogous" for courts to apply the initial interest confusion
doctrine from Brookfield.218
III. PURCHASING KEYED ADVERTISING ON ANOTHER'S TRADEMARK SHOULD
BE TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT UNDER THE INITIAL INTEREST CONFUSION
DOCTRINE
Trademark law should provide greater protection to trademark owners over
the Internet than in the brick-and-mortar world. One way to do this is by using
the initial interest confusion doctrine. 219 In today's information age, e-
commerce and online advertising are constantly changing and American
220jurisprudence must keep up.   Metatags, which were once the primary tools221
search engines used to produce relevant results lists, are in decline. Today,
companies like Google use keyed advertising to drive their search engines and
generate business revenue. Other companies use methods such as Google's
213. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 402, 409 (2d Cir. 2005)
(finding that WhenU.com used plaintiff's trademark internally in its list of keywords and did not
allow other companies to view or add to that list of keywords).
214. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1025 n.16, 1030
& n.43 (9th Cir. 2004).
215. See 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 402, 409; Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1025 n.16, 1030 & n.43.
216. See Zweihom, supra note 30, at 1362.
217. See id at 1364-65.
218. See Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 (9th
Cir. 1999).
219. See id; see also Shea, supra note 2, at 538.
220. See Shea, supra note 2, at 529 (commenting that "[c]onsumers can quickly get
information about new products, compare prices, and make purchases faster than ever"). Shea
also states that "[a]s companies vigorously compete for consumer attention and money, they have
discovered new techniques to exploit their competitors' goodwill to attract new consumers to
their websites and products." Id.
221. Zweihom, supra note 30, at 1362-64; see also MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra
note 2, § 25:69, at 25-198 ("Search engines in the early days of the Internet relied heavily on
metatags to find Web sites. However, modem search engines make little if any use of
metatags.").
222. MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 25:69, at 25-198 ("By 2003, three-
quarters of all on-line searches used GOOGLE or sites that used GOOGLE's search results.");
Zweihom, supra note 30, at 1364-65.
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AdWords program to compete for a greater share of the ever-growing Internet
223
market. Thus, as Internet business models have replaced metatag use with
keyed advertising, courts need to evolve and recognize that the purchase of
keyed advertising on another's mark is trademark infringement.
224
Some commentators believe that the extension of the initial interest
confusion doctrine to Internet cases has been "reflexive." 225 They suggest that
trademark infringement cases involving metatags and search engines that
trigger sponsored links should "apply traditional trademark analysis" instead of
the initial interest confusion doctrine because trademarks now "receive greater
protection online than offline." 226 However, providing heightened trademark
protection over the Internet would be a positive development.
Courts should not stray from the traditional likelihood of confusion test.
227
Whether implicitly or explicitly, courts analyze initial interest confusion within
the context of the traditional likelihood of confusion test.228 Moreover, many
courts have correctly used initial interest confusion as an additional factor in
the likelihood of confusion test.
229
Another way to analyze initial interest confusion is to view it as an extension
of the "evidence of actual confusion" factor under the traditional likelihood of
confusion test. 23° Evidence of actual confusion is a factor that should be read
broadly and extended to cover all types of confusion such as post-sale, reverse,
and initial interest confusion.231 In reality, initial interest confusion is actual
223. See Zweihom, supra note 30, at 1368-69.
224. See, e.g., Shea, supra note 2, at 530 ("Courts have struggled to comprehend [Internet]
technology and strike parallels with traditional means of infringement. Legal arguments are
stretched and strained as the law attempts to reach a just result.").
225. See, e.g., Zweihorn, supra note 30, at 1381.
226. Id.; see also Niki R. Woods, Note, Initial Interest Confusion in Metatag Cases: The
Move from Confusion to Diversion, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 393, 417-18 (2007) (urging courts
to apply the traditional likelihood of confusion test).
227. See, e.g., Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc. (Interstellar Starship 1), 184 F.3d
1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing initial interest confusion along side the traditional
likelihood of confusion factors).
228. See, e.g., id.
229. See Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 462 & n.13 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that
the district court "included an 'Internet initial interest confusion factor' in the [traditional
likelihood of confusion] balancing test"); Tdata Inc. v. Aircraft Technical Publishers, No. 2:03-
cv-264, 2008 WL 2169353, at *1 & n.2 (S.D. Ohio May 21, 2008) (citing Louis ALTMAN &
MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES §
22:11.50 n.1.20 (4th ed. 2008)); cf Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423
F.3d 539, 550-51 & n.15 (6th Cir. 2005) (refusing to extend the intitial interest confusion
doctrine to product-shape trademark actions, but recognizing that in other circumstances,
"evidence of initial interest confusion [may come] into the eight factor Frisch test as a substitute
for evidence of actual confusion").
230. See AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979) (listing
evidence of actual confusion as one factor of the likelihood of confusion test).
231. See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 23:5, at 23-20 to -27 (discussing
various types of confusion).
[Vol. 58:535
The Need for the Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine
confusion that is dispelled more quickly.232 Nevertheless, the potential for
harm is still the same.
233
In a recent case, the United States District Court for the Eastem District of
New York cited Merck in holding that that "there is nothing improper with"
234purchasing keyed advertising on another's trademark. This holding is
misguided and simply not true. Intent is a weighty factor in any traditional
likelihood of confusion analysis. 235 The intentional purchase of keyed
advertising on another's trademark, whether under the theory of initial interest
confusion or not, will be extremely probative of likelihood of confusion, and
should be a per se violation of the Lanham Act.236
IV. CONCLUSION
While courts must be careful not to overextend its use, the initial interest
confusion doctrine continues to play a vital role in protecting trademarks in the
237modem, Internet-driven business world. Courts can avoid overextending the
doctrine by applying initial interest confusion within the framework of the
well-established likelihood of confusion test. The best way to incorporate the
doctrine into the likelihood of confusion test is to add initial interest confusion
as an additional factor for the courts to consider.238 Initial interest confusion
should not be abandoned simply out of fear of misapplication, 239 but should be
applied in those cases where the evidence is ample and dispositive.
Policing the unauthorized use of trademarks as keyed advertisements is one
area where initial interest confusion can, and should continue to, be applied.
Without the availability of the initial interest confusion doctrine, keyed
advertising poses a serious threat to both the private and public interests that
232. Interstellar Starship 1, 184 F.3d at 1110 ("We recognize a brand of confusion called
'initial interest' confusion, which permits a finding of a likelihood of confusion although the
consumer quicly becomes aware of the source's actual identity and no purchase is made as a
result of the confusion."); see also MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 23:6, at 23-28
to -31.
233. See Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 365 F. Supp.
707, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
234. S & L Vitamins, Inc. v. Australian Gold, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d 188, 201 (E.D.N.Y.
2007) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
235. See supra note 9 (listing "defendant's intent" as one of the traditional likelihood of
confusion factors); see also Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,
1059 (9th Cir. 1999) ("The law has long been established that if an infringer adopts his
designation with the intent of deriving benefit from the reputation of the trade-mark or trade
name, its intent may be sufficient to justify the inference that there are confusing similarities."
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
236. See id. Thus, "[a]n inference of confusion has similarly been deemed appropriate where
a mark is adopted with the intent to deceive the public." Id.
237. See generally Shea, supra note 2, at 538-42 (explaining various applications of the
initial interest confusion theory).
238. See, e.g., Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 462 & n.13 (2d Cir. 2004).
239. See Zweihorn, supra note 30, at 1347, 1381.
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240trademark law seeks to protect. Private interests of trademark owners are
vulnerable to a competitor's unauthorized use of the owner's trademark over
the Internet.24 1 Public interests are also threatened because of the deception
and confusion caused when a competitor purchases keyed advertising, and
infringes on the existing "good will" associated with that mark.242 Therefore, a
competitor who purchases keyed advertising on another's trademark should be
liable for trademark infringement under the initial interest confusion doctrine.
240. See supra notes 2-4.
241. See supra note 2.
242. See supra note 2.
[Vol. 58:535
